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Abstract—Voice over Internet telephony (VoIP) is extremely pervasive today. Its cheap availability and ease of setup has made the
serial harassers, criminals and even terrorists to use it for illegal activities. This makes VoIP subject to surveillance by Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). It has been observed that governments, in the solemn interest of national security, request companies
like Skype, Google and others to hand over content of communications between suspected criminals. Seeing a business opportunity, the
companies charge exorbitantly for retrieval thus costing the exchequer. Unlike any mechanisms of lawful interception which allow for
an asymmetric and unsustainable monopoly, this paper proposes hidden placement of hardware network analyzers to perform deep
packet inspection for  network traffic payloads and intercepting them before they reach the voice service provider by performing packet
classification in constant time using a Frame Check Sequence based classification technique as opposed to existing layer-by-layer
techniques for determining packets as candidates for Deep Packet Inspection.
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INTRODUCTION
With its low investment and a high return on investment,
a majority of telephony infrastructure services are now built
using VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). The growth of
digital traffic has made our lives extremely convenient,
however, on the flip side, it has made communication for
criminals, terrorists and miscreants ever easier. Lawful
interception, especially targeted and tactical, is the need of
the hour. However, due to current surveillance architectures
and the monopoly built around them by major service
providers, government efforts lie in tatters because of the
various procedures involved with service providers,
especially in the case of VoIP, where often, forensic
intercepts hold a higher value of intelligence than purely spot
(real-time) means. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a
pervasive but important solution that monitors a network's
data stream and identifies any anomalies in network packet
payloads. This may include inspection of application layer
payloads for purposes of intrusion detection and dynamic
analysis. DPI allows an agent to automatically inspect the
application layer payload of a packet. It is particularly useful
for analysis of text-encoded protocols or protocols that
transmit data in the clear. According to Azfar, Choo and Liu
[1], 6 out of 10 applications pass their voice in an
unencrypted form which can be decoded easily while another
application transmits both voice and text data from instant
messages in an unencrypted form. In passive interception,
flaws such as these are in fact a boon for lawful, targeted
interception, as communications are obtained using minimal
effort. In the context of intelligence gathering, certain
information may be passed which can be used to trace
potential targets using data gathered through cyber forensic
operations on a network scale. This information may contain
directions, messages, codes or transmission which may have
a direct effect on tactics in any situation. This actionable
intelligence must be treated top priority until and unless
action is taken regarding the input.  This presents the unique
and vast challenge of filtering or targeting Internet traffic
originating from possible multiple sources and presenting as
an intelligence input. Hofstede, Celeda et al [2] present a
case of flow analysis of captured sessions using popular
forensic tools.
This paper proposes fast packet classification which
forms the bedrock of high-grade intelligence through Internet
based communications. This approach also handles the
dropping of malformed packets and the system can be
deployed at the Internet Service Provider level easily through
port mirroring.
VOIP – WORKING AND FUNCTIONALITY
VoIP uses the Internet Protocol stack for transmitting
packets over the Internet containing a host of multimedia
communication, such as audio, video, images and instant
messages. A host of protocols are used for VoIP, such as the
older but legacy H.323 series of protocols and SIP (Session
Initiation Protocol), which is standardized by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The primary protocols used with VoIP are SIP and H.323
at the session layer, which is used to set up a phone call, and
RTP at the media layer, which handles the media portion of
the call.
Figure 1 shows an example of VoIP call (also called
session) between two parties. SIP requests and responses are
passed through multiple proxies which work around and not
through the firewalls to establish a session. RTP
communication is then between endpoints. VoIP services can
be used on any port, which makes it harder to detect [3].
Fig. 1:  Simple VoIP call using SIP and RTP
.
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SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The server is equipped with a hardware network analyzer
which captures the data packets of a network under
surveillance with the help of mirrored ports. The captured
data packets are made available in a forensic format called
Kamal Dump Files (KDF) files, which also contain session /
flow information. The administrator running the program
will thus get access a copy of the files containing the
captured packets. The network traffic contains data packets
belonging to many network protocols like SGMP, HTTP,
FTP, etc [12]. RTP is a media transfer protocol built on top
of UDP. The proposed solution considers only RTP packets
for further processing. Figure 2 shows the proposed system
architecture for the classification system. It is made of Packet
Filter and Packet Processor modules. The Packet Filter
module is where the proposed system is implemented. The
Monosek Protocol Engine (MPE) and the Network Flow
Engine (NFE) are hardware based processes to capture
packets. All packets classified for interception are passed to
the Packet Processor module, which extracts relevant
payloads for analysis.
Fig. 2:  System Architecture for DPI
Fig. 3: Algorithm for constant time packet classification for
DPI
The constant time packet classification algorithm works on
the hardware level (shown as pre-defined processes in
Figure 3).  For each frame received by the hardware network
analyzer, the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) algorithm is
run. On an Ethernet- II network, almost all packets are
framed using CRC for error-detection. The advantage of
running the FCS algorithm is that the FCS algorithm (which
usually resides on hardware) automatically checks via a
lookup on the byte stream to determine whether or not a
frame is malformed. A frame is said to have been received
correctly if the FCS algorithm (with its lookups) leaves a
CRC residue of the hexadecimal number 0xC704DD7B,
which is the value to be obtained irrespective of the
protocols used in the network, transport or application
layers. Since this is a 4 octet number, bit level parallelism
on higher word machines is generally used to determine this
CRC residue faster.
Every received frame is treated as an unsigned character
buffer in the Network Bye Order. Based on statistical
properties of presence media transfer protocols in packets
comprising session traffic, the position at which the
application layer protocol (RTP in this case) header begins /
ends / application layer payload begins can be determined
easily, as the unsigned character buffer is an array in
memory and lookups in an array take constant time.
DEEP PACKET INSPECTION (DPI)
The proposed system intends to build a classification
system for traffic between the calling parties and the LEA for
passive interception using DPI. Most detection systems
perform a layer by layer approach wherein each layer in the
OSI / IP stack is checked for consistency through various
header fields such as the checksum, header length, total
length and the application layer protocol type.
For VoIP traffic, statistical properties indicate unique
values present in various protocols [4, 5]. These unique
values can then be used for interception by simply going to
the offset value where these values are to be found in the
unsigned character buffer.
It can be argued that a more offensive strategy towards
lawful interception can be adopted by intercepting all of a
computer’s communications by offensive means, such as
active eavesdropping through a backdoor [6, 7] or
performing a conference call with the calling parties,
however, SIP, unlike H.323, has incorporated session
notifications [14] as part of its design. Any and all
participants in a session are notified of each other’s presence
for ensuring non-repudiation, thus putting the entire effort of
active interception in jeopardy [8].
We propose a more subtle, passive interception approach
is used to ensure complete interception. Unlike a “Man in
the Middle” attack mentioned in the previous paragraph
which can be detected and compromise the entire effort, we
propose a “Man On The Side” attack where LEA is allowed
to eavesdrop on a target of surveillance through port
mirroring using DPI. Another distinct advantage of this
approach is that using port mirroring, the hardware network
analyzer remains hidden on the entire network. Although the
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hardware network analyzer has its own globally unique
MAC address [9], even pings and port scans cannot detect
the hardware, thus making it a suitable fit for clandestine
interception. The files are also available for forensic analysis
if any packets are lost or if the analyzer hardware
malfunctions momentarily [10].
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The proposed system is evaluated with the data packets
containing various protocols, but returns all RTP packets
encoded with the PCM-A audio codec. To capture data
packets the Hardware Network Analyzer used for
experiments is Monosek Version 1.0. Malformed packets
were generated at random intervals for ensuring correct
detection. RTP packets were generated using rtpdump, an
automated tool for generating and sending RTP packets.
These data packets containing RTP with G.711 PCM-A
encoded data form the dataset for experimental analysis. The
performance of the proposed system was evaluated using the
overall processing time and the average processing time per
packet.
The constant time FCS check operation is made possible
as the CRC residue is checked irrespective of the input size,
that is, the size of the byte buffer containing the intercepted
packet. Thus, irrespective of the frame size as long as it is
less than the Maximum Transmission Unit for the network
for routing purposes, the FCS checking takes place in
constant time.
In the slower, layer-by-layer (LBL) approach, each layer
of the OSI stack in the frame is checked for errors, thus
causing a computational overhead. In the test, both TCP
(Transmission Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram
Protocol) packets were generated.
The overall processing time measures the total time taken
to classify all packets. Results were measured in
microseconds and tabulated for Overall Response Time as
shown in Table 1 and Graph 1.
Packets
Packet Classification Algorithm
Total time (μs)
FCS -
Check
LBL - TCP LBL - UDP
1000 762.48 903.93 1012.24
2000 1524.24 1812.788 2016.51
3000 2287.16 2715.222 3024.54
4000 3049.73 3610.22 4029.75
5000 3811.57 4521.98 5031.27
6000 4573.15 5427.28 6040.76
7000 5337.87 6324.11 7055.862
8000 6100.48 7227.78 8057.71
9000 6860.47 8131.45 9069.31
10000 7622.63 9034.04 10073.63
Table 1: Overall processing time for novel FCS
classification versus layer by layer DPI
Graph 1: Overall processing time for novel FCS system
versus layer by layer DPI
The average processing time per packet is the time taken to
initialize the packet buffer, receive the packet and perform
the classification technique applicable to the packet. Results
were measured for each classification technique in
increments of 1000 packets. Results of average processing
time are shown in Table 2 and Graph 2.
Pack-
ets
Packet Classification Algorithm
Average processing time per packet (μs)
FCS
Check
LBL - TCP LBL – UDP
1000 0.768 0.903 1.01
2000 0.762 0.906 1.008
3000 0.767 0.905 1.001
4000 0.765 0.902 1.007
5000 0.762 0.904 1.006
6000 0.769 0.904 1.009
7000 0.765 0.903 1.007
8000 0.706 0.903 1.007
9000 0.767 0.909 1.007
10000 0.763 0.900 1.006
Table 2: Average processing time per packet for the two
systems
Graph 2: Average processing time per packet
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CONCLUSION
Key experimental outcomes are – packet classification
was performed in constant time by checking the CRC
residue of the Frame Check Sequence (FCS). A protocol
independent technique was thus devised for packet
classification with an average processing time of 0.76
micro-seconds deployed and tested on a data packet size
varying from 1,000 to 10,000 packets. This shows
significant improvement over the layer by layer approach of
packet classification with an average packet processing time
of 0.903 and 1.03 micro-seconds respectively.
Any system using layer by layer packet classification
cannot be truly protocol independent as the system must
perform a traversal up the OSI stack for detecting the
protocol for error detection. The novel system for
classification not only classifies packets in constant time,
but also returns a pointer to application layer data as a
candidate for DPI routines at times up to 20 micro-seconds
faster than traditional layer-by –layer approaches.
Future work includes constant space packet DPI and
string matching of application layer payloads for statistical
anomaly detection and flow analysis.
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